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1. Introduction: 
Low income elasticity of demand was a key ingredient in the development of the 
Prebisch-Singer "Theory of Unequal Exchange"1,2. According to the theory, a country 
specializing in the production of primary products (usually seen as the area of comparative 
advantage of LDCs) will be worse off than a country speciahzing in industrial products under 
trade. This is especially if the Industrialized Countries (IC) have market power. 
A deterioration in the Terms of Trade (ToT) of a Developing Country is observed as the 
relative share of income spent on primary products declines due to the inelastic income elasticity 
of demand for primary products. Over time, due to the fall in the prices of primary products the 
industrialized countries benefit from growth in production, relative to those of manufactured 
products. Effectively, technical advance in primary production "defeats its own purpose,,3 since 
at least part of the benefits are transferred to the industrialized countries through lower prices for 
primary products. Technical advance in industrial production, on the other hand, benefits the 
industrialized countries relatively more because technological progress does not reduce prices for 
manufactured products to the same degree4• 
The Theory of LTnequaJ Exchange: 
Raul Prebisch (1949): "ECLA Economic Survey 59, as cited in Love (1987): Raul Prebisch and the Origins 
of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange", p. 90. 
Singer (1950): "The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries", AER Papers and 
Proceedings 40 no. 2 (May 1950). 
Prebisch (1959): "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries", p. 252. 
The policy implication Prebisch derived from this theory of unequal exchange was that an LDC should form 
manufacturing industries instead of following comparative advantage in the production of primary products. Pursuit 
of comparati\"e advantage was myopic because the LDCs necessarily would lose in the long run from deterioration 
in the terms of trade. 
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The Theory of Unequal Exchange can be illustrated as follows. Consider the following 
commodity market equilibrium condition: 
QD (m, Pop, P) = Qs (MC, P) (1) 
QD' the quantity demanded, is a function of nominal income (m), population (Pop) and price (P). 
Qs, the quantity supplied, is a function of marginal costs (MC) and price. The partial derivatives 
have the following signs: 
aQs aQD aQD 
--, --, -->0; 
ap am apop 
(2 ) 
Taking total derivatives of both sides and rearranging terms leads to the following 
equation: 
( aQs a
QD) aQD aQD aQs 
--- *dP = -*dm+--*dPop---*dMC 
ap ap am apop aMC 
(3 ) 
The coefficient on dP is greater than zero. The left hand side, the "change in price", is 
affected by the price elasticities of supply and demand. The right hand side indicates the factors 
which influence price. The first term reflects the income effect on demand. As income 
increases, demand increases, given the assumption of a normal good. The partial derivative of 
the quantity demanded with respect to income is included in the income elasticity of demand, the 
central parameter in the Prebisch-Singer theory. The higher the income elasticity of demand, the 
greater the (positive) change in price for that commodity (the importance of the income 
distribution is ignored in this model). 
The second term shows the influence of population growth on demand. As population 
increases, total demand increases (this model does not account for the effects of demographic 
structure on demand). The third term accounts for the effects of technological change. As 
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marginal costs decrease, the supply curve shifts to the right. 
Equation (3) allows for a more detailed analysis of the terms of trade. "Terms of trade" 
refers to the net barter terms of trade (namely the relation between the unit price of the primary 
product and the unit price of the manufactured product). From equation (3) the following result 
for terms of trade can be derived (PP = primary products, MF = manufactured products): 
ao PP aoppj-l ao PP ao PP ao PP ] 
_D _ _ _ s_ * _D_ *dm+ __ D_ *dPon- S *dMCPP 
dp PP appp BpPP am apop ~ BMCPP 
dToT""-- "" (4) 
dPMF [aO%F _ aO!:'j-l *[ aoir *dm+ aoir *dPop- ao!:' *dMCMF] 
apMF apMF am apop BMCMF 
Change in the development of the terms of trade depends not only on the Income 
elasticities of demand but, also on the price elasticities of supply and demand, population growth 
and technological progress. Technological progress for manufactured products often is assumed 
to be faster, which tends to improve the terms of trade. Population growth, usually, is assumed 
to have a greater effect on demand for primary products than on demand for manufactured 
products, thus improving the terms of trade. Assuming no change in population and in 
technology (dPop=O and dMC=O), (4) simplifies to: 
(S) 
Let Es (ED) denote the price elasticity of supply (demand), El the income elasticity of demand and 
EToT the elasticity of terms of trade, we get 
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( 
aoPP pp aoPP pp)-l aoPP 
__ S_ *~ ___ D_ *~ *ppp* __ D_ *.2!!..... *dm 
pp appp oPP appp oPP am oPP dTOT=~ = S D D (6) 
__ * __ -__ * __ *pMF* __ * __ *dm dPMF ( aQ:- pMF ao:" PMF)-l ao:" m 
apMF 0:- apMF 0:" am Qir 
Thus, ceteris paribus, an inelastic (elastic) income elasticity of demand for primary products 
(manufactured products) of less (greater) than unity leads to a deterioration in terms of trade. 
Empirical Analysis of the Terms of Trade 
Prebisch and Singer supported their hypothesis about deterioration of the terms of trade 
with empirical data. Prebisch analyzed the terms of trade of the United Kingdom for the period 
1876-80 to 1946-47. Great Britain was mainly an exporter of manufactured products and 
importer of primary products. Terms of trade thus were expected to improve for Great Britain. 
Singer cited data for the time after 1950, excluding petroleum after 1973 5,6. 
Numerous problems arise in evaluating the development of the terms of trade over time 
and authors differ about the behavior of the terms of trade for primary products. One problem 
for empirical estimation is the choice of the initial and the terminal year. Singer was criticized 
for using 1950 as an initial year because prices were unusually high at the beginning of the 
Korean war. He was further criticized for using a terminal year when prices for nonfuel primary 
products were generally low (due to the negative impact of the first oil price shock on economic 
Both cited in Balassa (1989): "Outward Orientation", p. 1653. 
6 In another paper Prados (1994) tests the Prebisch-Singer (PS) hypothesis for Spain and Britain. His findings 
strongly reject the PS hypothesis. Welfare of Spain's productive factors embodied in exportables improved in 
absolute and relative terms. 
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activity)7. Subsequent studies have shown inconclusive results, or reached the opposite 
conclusion, i.e., terms of trade improved for primary products8. 
Another problem for estimation is that imports of primary products are usually valued at 
cif (cost-insurance-freight) prices, whereas exports are valued at fob (free on board) prices. 
Prebisch, for example, used the ratio of fob export unit values to cif import unit values to 
estimate the terms of trade for Great Britain. This procedure was criticized by Ellsworth9, who 
pointed out that the improvement of terms of trade for Great Britain between 1876 and 1905 is 
explained by a reduction of transportation costs (which affected cif but not fob prices). If 
transportation costs are taken into account, the terms of trade even improved slightly for primary 
Unit values are usually derived as a ratio of value to weight. This procedure also favors 
manufactured goods, since there has been a shift over time to lighter materials. The best example 
for changes in quality and weight is probably the computer industry, where 6 pounds of computer 
in 1950 are not comparable to the present notebook computer with a 486 processor. 
Technological progress in the computer industry is probably faster than in any other industry. 
The model developed above predicts a decrease in the relative price of computers. Yet prices 
per unit weight need not show a decline. 
This leads to the problem of indices. An appropriate index should take care of the 
See Balassa (1989): "Outward Orientation" p. 1653ff, also for the subsequent paragraph. 
Maizels (1963): "Industrial gro\\th and world trade"; Spraos (1980): "The statistical debate on the net barter 
terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactures"; all cited in Balassa (1989): "Outward Orientation". 
Ellsworth (1956): "The terms of trade between primary producing and industrial countries". 
10 The ratio of fob to cif prices could show that the terms of trade improve for both trading partners in the 
event of transportation costs declines. 
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problems of quality and weight changes over time and to represent a "general" price level for 
manufactured and for primary products, respectively. Therefore, prices of individual commodities 
have to be weighted. The choice of such indices is difficult and quite subjective. Several indices 
have been used in empirical studies fl and yield conflicting results (a negative trend in the terms 
of trade with one index is reversed to a positive trend with a different indexI2). 
More difficulties arise as many variables cannot be controlled. Technological change and, 
the availability and quality of substitutes and complements can have a major impact on (relative) 
pnces. Any shock affecting supply and demand (like political situations, wars, drought, 
population growth) makes the determination of influences on the terms of trade difficult. 
Another reason cited for the poor performance of LDCs is the market power of the "center" (the 
industrialized countries). Prebisch pointed out that the United Kingdom was the "world's 
principal dynamic center"13 in the 19th century, a role later taken over by the United States. 
During and immediately following World War 11, when the Prebisch-Singer theory was 
developed, the United States played a central role as trading partner for the Latin American 
countries14 . Even though the U.S. dominance did not last long15, it influenced policy suggestions 
and political action substantially, especially in Latin America. Today, concern about market 
11 For instance the U.N. price index for the world exports of primary products other than petroleum, the World 
Bank's index for thirty-three nonfuel commodities, with further adjustments for quality changes. 
12 Balassa (1989): "Outward Orientation", p. 1654. 
J3 Prebisch (1959): "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries", p. 266 
14 Sheahan (1987): "Patterns of Development in Latin America", p. 163 
IS Bairoch (1975): "The Economic Development of the Third World since 1900", p. 103 
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power focusses more on transnational corporations (TNCs). Intensification of intra-regional 
trade 16 and the formation of cartels for primary products were suggested as ways to 
counterbalance market power of the center. 
Several commodity cartels have been established, the most famous of which is the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC faced favorable conditions for 
establishing a cartel, i.e., demand for oil was inelastic at least in the short run. When OPEC was 
formed a large proportion of production was controlled by a few countries (oil is a relatively 
homogenous commodity with little room for competition in terms of offering higher quality). 
Nevertheless, OPEC did not maintain output share and price at the high levels of 1973. OPEC's 
share in world production fell from 68% in 1973 to 40% in 1985. Nominal prices fell from a 
peak of $34 in 1980 to $13 by 198617.18.19. 
We thus see that given the problems with the study of real world data using experimental 
16 For instance through the formation of a Central American Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFT A) and the Andean Group; see Furtado (J 976): "Economic Development of Latin America", p. 
154. 
17 Balassa (J 989): "Outward Orientation", p. 1661. 
18 Some authors argue that the increase in prices was not caused necessarily by the formation of the cartel 
but maybe by a failure of the property right system for oil. At the end of the Second World War, international oil 
companies controIIed the production and marketing of oil from the Persian Gulf countries. They owned the oil but 
did not ha\'e ownership of the reserves. Thus a property right failure occurred, where companies acted according 
to the "rule of capture", not taking into account the future value ofreserves. Smith, V.L., "Property Rights in Natural 
Resources: Institutions and Ideologies", 1984. 
19 Numerous commodities have been considered for cartelization by producer countries. Some of these include 
copper, tin, bauxite, phosphates, rubber, tropical timber, coffee, tea, cocoa, bananas and metals. Cartels to "stabilize" 
prices include the International Coffee Agreement (lCA), the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting 
Countries (CIPEC), and the Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB) (Balassa (J 989): "Outward Orientation", 
p. 1660). The lCA "may have raised prices somewhat", but this might have been caused by Brazil unilaterally 
reducing its output so as to maximize profits (See Van Duyne (J 975): "Commodity Cartels", p. 608f, who argues 
that Brazil, with 34% share of the world production, sets prices, prices for other coffees adjust to clear the market 
and Brazil supplies the residual demand). Despite the presence of several cartels none of them has completely 
achieved their goals. One might even argue that" thus far, there have been no successful cartels ... " (Balassa 
(1989)). 
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methods it is the possible to control variables that cannot be controlled in the field. Valuations 
of the commodities can be held constant and the problem of exogenous factors influencing supply 
and demand conditions in the initial, or terminal year, can be minimized. There are no changes 
in qualities and/or weights of products. The players in the experiments are trading fictitious 
commodities of constant quality over time, reflected by induced valuations20 for the commodities 
that does not change over time. Also, in an experimental market conditions favorable for the 
cartel can be established. The homogenous (fictitious) product has no substitutes and a small 
number of producers who control the entire production. There is no threat of entry, a problem 
for any cartel. Communication among producers can be established at very low "cost" by 
convening before each period. Communication is also facilitated by typing messages and sending 
them through a computer network. These agreements are private and cannot be monitored by 
industrialized countries. 
Cheating on an agreement can be observed by all producers of the commodity. However, 
the incentive structure is unchanged, a multi-person prisoner's dilemma game. It is in the best 
interest of each producer to let the other producers cut back their production to keep up the price 
and increase its own production to maximise profits. Thus, contributing to the instability of the 
cartel. 
n. The Experimental Design 
The Environment 
We first test the basic premise of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. Given the low income 
20 see V.L Smith, "Experimental Economics: Indu.:ed Value Theory," American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 66, 274-279. 
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elasticity of demand for primary products and the 'market-power' of the industrialized countries 
does trade result in a worsening of TOT for the primary product producer (the developing 
country)? Thus, in our first experimental design we have a single industrialized country (a 
monopoly) and four DC's. The DC's are not allowed to communicate and hence there is no room 
for explicit collusion. 
We then study the effect on terms of trade for a competitive model with four IC's and four 
DC's. In the first part of these experiments explicit communication is not allowed between the 
DC's. In the second part of these experiments explicit communication is allowed (between the 
DC's) and they have the opportunity to form a cartel. This part of the experiment is intended to 
test the following hypothesis. Can the DC's form successful cartels, and by how much is the 
cartel able to improve its terms of trade? 
In all designs four DC's participate .. In design-I we have only one industrialized country 
which, is then a monopsony in the X market and a monopoly in the Y market. In other designs 
(ll and Ill) there are four industrialized countries. Despite the fact that the main interest of this 
study is the net barter terms of trade, the number of units of good X exchanged for good Y, 
experimental money is introduced in all designs. In every period, each agent (i) is endowed with 
a certain amount of money, M/I The exchange rate (from experimental money to dollars) is 
private information. Money is used because it helps the process of equilibration22 and it serves 
as a medium of exchange. This last feature is especially important, since without money 
problems of indivisibility of commodities occur. 
21 This amount should not be regarded as a budget constraint. It is sufficient to cover all reasonable 
transactions. It can be viewed as (relatively) unlimited borrowing for purchases. 
22 Money is an "obvious feature of any well-func~ioning market process". NoussairlPlottlRiezman (1992): "An 
Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade", p. 3 
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With the introduction of money the maximization problem changes slightly, since payoffs 
are derived from both utility (from holdings goods X and Y at the end of each period) and from 
trading A developing country maximizes, 
(8) 
and an industrialized country maximizes, 
(9) 
Where, WX 1 (WYJ) are the resource endowments of good X (Y) for a developing (industrialized) 
country and the non-negativity constraints for the final allocation, xl' yj, xJ and Yj>O. The budget 
constraints (as noted earlier Mj is chosen such that it is not binding) for the DC 
M, ~ p * y, - p * (Wx, - x ' ) ~ y ~ x ~ ~ (lO ) 
and for the industrialized country (or countries). 
(ll) 
Assuming price taking behavior, a more stringent result than the equality of the marginal 
rate of substitution (MRSxy) and the price ratio (p/Py) is derived for the competitive equilibrium. 
Since utility is expressed in monetary terms, in equilibrium the marginal utility of x (u,J has to 
equal the price of x (Px) and the marginal utility of Y (uy) has to equal the price of y (Py)' 
Therefore, it is possible to test whether in each market prices converge to the equilibrium or not. 
One possible problem in our experimental design is that subjects can go bankrupt. To 
avoid this:3 subjects are given a starting capital of $5,24 In addition to this subjects are trained 
23 This is done as experimental subjects can not be asked to pay debts they accumulate in an experiment. 
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several times without salient rewards to improve their understanding of the institution. 
Parameterization 
For the experiments a linear transformation of the form was chosen. The parameters 
values chosen are, a=0.9, ~=0.8, y=2000, 0=10025 . 
(12) 
The choice of the parameter ~, the income elasticity of demand, is especially important. 
For the laboratory market 0.8 was chosen. This is the parameter Prebisch used for the numerical 
example in his original paper. 26 
Up to a certain point all income is spent on the primary product, X. In this region, where 
Y=o, preferences can be represented by a lexicographic preference ordering. The same choice 
behavior is observed if an individual cares only about good X. The following functional form 
is chosen, with, 11=300 and !l=0.25, to represent such preferences. 
u(x,y) = "1 *x l1 (13) 
The payoff tables for different combinations of final holdings of x and y, as well as two tables 
with the marginal utilities of x respectively y (given certain holdings of the other commodity) are 
24 The subjects receive their payoffs at the end of a series of experiments. This made it unlikely that the total 
payoff over all experiments is negative, and indeed the lowest payoff was greater $9. 
Note, that this utility function can only be derived for an interior solution (x>O, y>O). 
Prebisch (1959), p. 253 
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given in the appendix.27 
The Experimental Design 
The following four different designs were chosen: 
<table-1 here> 
In design I, four DC's face a single industrial country (monopoly/monopsony). In design II, the 
four DC's face four industrialized countries (neither side has market power). In design III four 
DC's can form a cartel against four industrialized countries. 
Four experiments were conducted in designs I, 11 and Ill. Each experiment consisted of 
a 'trainer':8, an inexperienced and an experienced session. The sessions with inexperienced and 
experienced subjects in designs I, ll, and III consisted of a low income phase (-I) followed by 
a high income phase (_II)29. After the trainer, subjects participate in two more sessions, first as 
inexperienced, then as experienced subjects. For our purposes we only use the data from the 
experienced subjects. These experiments utilized the same payoff tables as in the five periods 
at the end of the training session. 3D 
In the second phase the endowment (of both the industrialized country and the DC's) is 
doubled in order to achieve a substantial effect on the equilibrium predictions. This is done to 
2~ All three tables are given to the subjects during the training session, and again at the beginning of each 
experiment. All payoffs are in experimental Shillings, which are converted into U.S. dollars at a certain rate. The 
only difference between the tables used in the training session and the ones used in the subsequent experiments is 
that they are mUltiplied by a constant factor. 
18 The trainer was used to familiarize subjects with the trading institution, the payoff tables and the accounting 
procedures. To learn the trading institution, subjects went through a computerized training program, which allowed 
them to trade with computerized traders. For a discussion on how the trainer was run see Appendix. 
19 The data analysis is only done with the experienced subjects. 
30 Except for experiment 1 in design I: the payoff tables for the third session were not ready then. Subjects 
recei\"ed therefore the same payoff tables as in the trainer. 
I TABLE-I: Experimental Designs I 
Four DC Four DC 
Without Communication With Communication 
Single IC Design I 
(4 Experiments) -----------
Four IC's Design Il Design III 
(4 Experiments) (4 Experiments) 
Phases within designs I, Il and Ill: 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
Trainer Low Income No second phase 
Inexperienced Low Income High Income 
Experienced Low Income High Income 
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study the effect of lower income elasticity of demand for the pnmary product (X). The 
endowments are chosen to be Wx=5 (10) for the LDCs and, Wy=lO (20) for the industrialized 
country (IC) in design I in phase-I (-I1). 
Increasing the number of IC's from one to four changes the equilibrium predictions. We 
chose to hold the competitive equilibrium allocation per country constant in the first (Ax=4, 
Ay=2) and the second (Ax=8, Ay=4) phase. This also fixes the equilibrium price ratio. However, 
the endowments (Wx and Wy) per country have to be adjusted. The endowments chosen are 
Wx=8 (16) for LDCs and Wy=4 (8) for industrialized countries in design Ill. The only difference 
between designs Il and III is the possibility for the LDCs to form non-binding agreements. 
Table-2 gives an overview of the parameterization of different experiments as well as the 
allocations, prices, and trading quantities which would occur given a competitive equilibrium. 
<table-2 here> 
The Effect of Market Power (Table-3) 
Multiple equilibria are possible in this scenario. The following two extremes can be 
compared. The case where the industrialized country exerts its market power and the DC's act 
as price takers is the one presented in design-I. The maximization problem for the cartel is then 
the following, 
4 Max. :=1 U(Xi'Yi) + Px*(WXi-Xi ) +PY*Yi 
W.I. t,Xi'Yi ~ 
Note, that both Px and Py are also functions of the summation of both Xi and Yi' 
(14) 
For design-Ill the results for a DC cartel versus price taking industrialized countries is 
presented. A country has an incentive to undercut its rival as at the monopoly price not all cartel 
members can sell the good. A successful cartel improves its Terms of Trade. The cartel can 
TABLE-2: Endowments, Competitive Equilibrium Allocations and Prices. 
Des. Wx Wy Ax Ay Px Py ToT Qx Qy 
I 5 10 74- 89- 0.54- 4 8 
(10) (20) 4 2 105 137 1.18 (8) (16) 
Il 8 4 (37- (67- (0.45- 16 8 
(16) (8) (8) (4) 43) 82) 0.64) (32) (16) III 
The numbers In parentheses are the values for phase-Il, when the resource endowments 
(Wx resp. Wy) are doubled. 
TABLE 3.: TIlE EFFECTS OF MARKET POWER 
Prices Industrial ized Developing Surplus 
COtultry (-ics) COtultries 
Design Phase p" py x.; Yj u(x,y) Payoff Xj Yi u(x,y) Payoff TSP CESP 
I1 
I ~ I 64 599 4 6 1420 3560 4 1 1023 488 5512 5800 27 705 8 16 2032 4636 8 1 1210 559 6872 7820 
11 1 90 113 4 2 1160 1028 4 2 1160 1292 9280 9280 
2 40 75 8 4 1564 1542 8 4 1564 1586 12512 12512 
III 1 358 67 2 2 889 307 6 2 1291 1873 8720 9280 
2 431 35 2 5 1048 291 14 3 1637 2394 10740 12512 
- Design I shows the effect of the IC exercising its monopoly power. 
- Design 11 shows the result in the competitive equilibrium. 
-Design III shows the effect of a successful cartel when there are four ICs. 
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improve its TOT from 5.34 to 12.29. In all other cases (under both competitive equilibrium and 
the monopoly assumption) the terms of trade worsen for the DC's. Table-4 shows the terms of 
trade for different designs. 
<table-4 here> 
For the competitive equilibrium a price range is possible. In the top row of design-lIthe 
TOT if prices are at the midpoint of this range are displayed. The limits for the terms of trade 
are presented in parentheses. 
Trading Institution 
The multiple unit double auction mechanism (MUDA)31 trading institution is used. 
MUDA is chosen for two reasons, first, it allows us to simultaneously trade in multiple markets 
and, second, the double auction mechanism has good convergence properties. This is particularly 
important because it is difficult to reach a General Equilibrium in two distinct markets at the 
same time. 3:.33 
Subjects are not allowed to cancel bids or asks. However, in all experiments subjects are 
31 For a description ofMUDA see Plott (1991): "A Computerized Laboratory Market System And Research 
Support System For The Multiple Unit Double Auction". 
32 For a test of the competitive model in multiple markets (but additively separable demand) see 
NoussairlPlottlRiezman (1992): "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade". The authors 
report thilt in their multi-market environment only the qualitative predictions of the competitive model hold. 
33 A transaction in the double auction can be initiated by either buyers or sellers. Buyers can submit a bid 
which is higher than the standing bid. This bid becomes the standing bid. If a seller accepts the bid a transaction 
takes place with the price equal to the standing bid. Alternatively, a buyer can accept the standing offer, in which 
case a transaction takes place with the price equal to the standing offer. A seller can submit an offer which is lower 
than the standing offer. This offer becomes the standing offer. The double auction does not offer a structural 
advantage to either side of the market, i.e., prices tend to converge to the competitive equilibrium (and not to stay 
above, or below, it). 
TABLE-4: Terms of Trade in Different Designs 
Design Phase Competitive Monopoly Cartel 
Equilibrium 
I 1 0.79 0.11 
2 0.54 0.04 
II 1 0.79 
(0.54-1.18) 
2 0.54 
(0.45-0.64) 
1111 I : 1 0.
79
1 
0.54 1 
5.341 
12.29 : 
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In the position of a trader, i.e., they can buy and sell units In both markets. This feature 
essentially enables subjects to erase their own offer, or bid, by accepting it. The reason for 
putting subjects in the role of a trader was to ease the process of equilibration. 
In this complex environment it is possible to sell more units than the equilibrium quantity. 
The following example and figure-l clarify this. We can get overtrading because of, both, the 
sequential character of the double auction and the interlinked demands in the two markets. 
Suppose that prices in both markets are within the equilibrium range, for instance in phase-I, at 
100 in both markets. The supply and demand curves (SO and DO respectively) indicate the initial 
position of a developing country, endowed with 8 units of X and no unit of Y. At a price of 100 
it is profitable to sell up to seven units of X, more than the equilibrium quantity of four. 
Suppose, the country sells six units of X. Holding two units of X and no units of Y it is 
profitable to buy two units of Y at a price of 100. Since the marginal value of X increases with 
the amount of Y a country holds it is now profitable to buy two units of X. After this 
transaction, the country now possesses four units of X and two units of Y, the equilibrium 
quantities. The country has exploited all potential gains from trade at these prices (or, for any 
price within the equilibrium range). It has done so by acting both as a seller and a buyer of X. 
Likewise a sequence of profitable trades is possible in which a country acts both as a buyer and 
seller of y34. 
For the analysis of prices all transaction prices are taken into account. However, net 
quantities are reported, i.e., sales (purchases) by DC's minus purchases (sales) by DC's in market 
34 At these prices buying three units of Y is prvfitable, then selling four units of X and selling one unit of 
Y. 
Figure-1 : Sequential Evolution of Supply and Demand 
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X (y).35 
Common Features of the Data Analvsis 
Due to the introduction of money into the system, and as utility is expressed in monetary 
terms, separate equilibrium predictions for both markets can be derived. The market for the 
primary product (market X) is analyzed first. This is followed by the analysis of the market for 
manufactured products (market Y). 
The following econometric model is used to analyze the change in prices over time36 . 
pt=et. +P *Pt-l +y *f [T( t) -T( t-l) ] +€t 
Where, Pt is defined as the difference between the transaction price, Pt> and the equilibrium 
prediction (EQ). The function fIT(t) - T(t-l)] allows for a shift of prices at the beginning of the 
period. The functional form considered was f(.) = [(T(t) - T(t-l))(f(t)]. This functional form 
implies that the shift decreases with the number of periods. Using prices lagged by one period 
as independent variable substantially reduces the (positive) autocorrelation .. 
The parameters of the model can be interpreted as follows. The asymptotic equilibrium 
prediction is defined by EQ + aI(1-~), a =0 indicates convergence to the equilibrium prediction 
35 Subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics classes at the University of Arizona. Each participant 
was paid $20 for showing up on time for all three sessions of the experiment. Subjects earned, in addition to that, 
salient rewards, depending on their decisions, ranging from about $10 to $85. For each subject group all sessions 
took place within one week. 
36 All models considered allowed for a change of prices over time. Let the t and T denote observation number 
(counteri from the beginning of the experiment) and period number, respectively. The model PI = Cl + p*exp(-t) 
+ Et assumes a constant rate of convergence from one observation to the next where Cl is the asymptotic equilibrium 
prediction. A significant coefficient on exp(-t) indicates that prices change over time (they increase if P is negative, 
decrease if P is positiye). The r:-:odel PI = Cl + p*exp(-T) + ~ assumes that prices are constant within a period and 
change at a constant rate across periods. The coefficients have similar interpretations as in the previous model. In 
both models P was usually positive and significant, indicating a decrease of prices both within a period and across 
periods. 
Neither model predicted very accurately (very low R2), since they failed to take into account simultaneously 
the change in price across periods and across transactic,ns. A decrease of this form, sa- tooth, was a common pattern 
obseryed in many experiments. 
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EQ. The choice of EQ does not affect the asymptotic prediction, it only changes the value and 
the standard error of the estimated constant term CI.. If the absolute value of ~ ~l, the model does 
not converge to any particular point, ~<O implies that prices overshoot the equilibrium (but 
eventuaIIy converge if the absorute value is less than one), 1>~>0 greater than zero implies 
convergence at a constant rate to an equilibrium from one direction, y> «) 0 indicates that prices 
shift upvv'ard (dovmward) when the period changes. 
Terms of trade are calculated as the ratio of the average transaction price in market X 
divided by the average transaction price in market Y. For the statistical analysis only one 
measure of the terms of trade per phase of an experiment was used. This is the ratio of the 
average of the contract prices in the last three periods in market X and Y. This procedure 
reduces each experiment to two observations, namely the final terms of trade for phase-I and two. 
Statistical tests are therefore conducted for all experiments within each design. 
In all cases the competitive equilibrium is not a specific price but a range of prices. 
Prices were said to be at the competitive equilibrium if either of the following hypotheses could 
not be rejected: 
a) Cl. = 0, against the alternative Cl. > 0, when the high endpoint of the competitive range 
entered the statistical model as equilibrium prediction (EQ). 
b) Cl. = 0, against the alternative Cl. < 0, when the low endpoint of the competitive range 
was used for EQ. 
If the asymptotic equilibrium prediction (which is independent of the choice of EQ) is 
within the competitive range, neither hypothesis can be rejected. If the high (low) end of the 
equilibrium range is entered as EQ and the result is that Cl. is greater (less) than zero it is not 
necessary to test the other hypothesis. 
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The following abbreviations used in the text. D3PIXE3Y represents design Ill, phase-I, 
experienced subjects, experiment 3, market y37. 
Design-I: Industrialized Monopoly and Four Developing Countries. 
In the "monopoly" design (design I) the four DC are facing a single industrialized country 
(henceforth, IC). The IC is in the role of a monopsony in the primary product market and in the 
role of a monopoly in the manufactured product market. According to the monopoly/monopsony 
model, the IC should be able to lower prices in market X and to increase prices in market Y 
(compared to the competitive equilibrium, CE). Consequently, the terms of trade are expected 
to be worse than in the competitive equilibrium. 
In general, all subjects in the role of the IC are able to raise the price in their output 
market substantially above the competitive level, though not always to the level predicted by the 
monopoly model. The price in the market for manufactured products is higher. Prices in market 
Y usually decrease from phase-I to phase-H, contradicting the monopoly model. In the market 
for primary products the monopsony fails to exploit its market power. Especially in phase-H 
prices are often above the CE. Terms of trade (ToT) are usually below the CE, but above the 
level predicted by the monopoly model. ToT for the experienced subjects increase in three cases. 
Earnings of experienced industrialized countries are between the competitive level and the 
monopoly level. Earnings of DC are usually below the competitive level. 
The Market for Primary Products 
The monopsony model predicts that prices should decrease in market X compared to the 
This annotation is shortened to D3XE3 in tables and graphs. 
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competitive equilibrium. 38 The average contract prices are displayed in figure-2. 
In the beginnning of phase-I in market X prices are volatile in some experiments but, 
stabilize in the later periods. Prices are generally within the competitive range at the end of 
phase-I, with the exception of one experiment. At the end of phase-H, prices are above the 
competitive equilibrium in two experiments. Only in one experiment are prices consistently close 
to the monopsony prediction. 
In experiment-3, prices are close to the monopsony prediction in phase-I, but substantially 
above even the competitive level in phase-I!. Prices are initially above the competitive level but, 
are at the CE at the end of phase-I in all cases. At the end of phase-I, prices are at the CE in 
experiment-2 and slightly above the CE in experiment-4. 
Convergence 
All asymptotic predictions in phase-I are within the competitive range or below the lower 
bound (CEL). In phase-I prices are above the CEH39, except for experiment-I. The results using 
(EQ=CEL) in phase-I and (EQ=CEH) in phase-I!4o are in Table-5. Whether prices converge to 
CEL in phase-I, or to the monopsony prediction, is not clear. onvergence to either, CEL or CEH, 
cannot be rejected41 in most cases. Only in experiment-l prices converge to the monopsony 
level42 . The asymptotic predictions for phase-I! are usually above CEH, the difference is often 
38 The competitive range in phase-I (two) is 74-105 (37-43), the monopsony model predicts 64 (27), thus in 
both phases only 10 Shillings below the low end of the competitive range. 
39 The high end of the competitive range. 
40 For experiment I the results for EQ = eEL are presented. 
41 In DIPIXEIX prices converge into the competitive range and are significantly different from the 
monopsony prediction. 
4:! In experiment 1 \vith experienced subjects, prices converge to even belo\v the competitive level. Using the 
monopoly prediction for EQ, the hypothesis (0.=0) is rejected at a significance level of 1 %. 
Figure-2: Average Contract Prices 
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Table-5 
Tests for Convergence-Design I Market Y (Primary Product) 
Model- p(t)=a + b * p(t-l) +c * [T(t}-T(t-l)]!f 
p(t) = P(t}-EQ; Asymptote = EQ + Alphal{l-Beta) 
EQ in phase-l :74 EQ in phase-II:37 
Coeff. Stand. Devn. 
Dl XE I-Phase-I Alpha -12.24 3.27 
Beta 0.29 0.14 
Gamma -13.57 16.81 
Asympt. 56.78 
Dl XE 1-Phase-11 Alpha -3.95 l.20 
Beta 0.64 0.11 
Gamma 10.77 7.37 
As)mpt. 32.08 
DIXE2-Phase-I Alpha 6.43 4.56 
Beta 0.74 0.10 
Gamma 36.04 29.15 
Asympt. 98.67 
DIXE2-Phase-II Alpha 0.71 0.54 
Beta 0.86 0.06 
Gamma -4.72 5.32 
As)mpt. 47.92 
DlXE3-Phase-I Alpha -1.22 4.36 
Beta 0.11 0.11 
Gamma -42.88 55.45 
Asympt. 72.63 
D 1 XE3-Phase-II Alpha 5.88 1.20 
Beta 0.81 0.04 
Gamma 22.70 4.78 
As)mpt. 74.05 
D 1 XE4-Phase-I Alpha 21.09 6.14 
Beta 0.20 0.12 
Gamma 46.39 57.64 
Asympt. 100.43 
D 1 XE4-Phase-II Alpha 11.39 3.20 
Beta 0.50 0.10 
Gamma 75.73 23.78 
Asympt. 65.61 
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significant43 . The exception IS agam experiment- 1, where pnces are below CEL and not 
significantly different from the monopsony prediction in both the cases. ~ is positive and less 
than one, indicating convergence towards equilibrium from one side. In most cases ~ is 
significant44, y usually is not significant. This indicates that in design I prices in market X do 
not shift at the beginning of periods45 . 
Market for Manufactured Products 
In the market for manufactured products the IC has market power as a seller. The 
predictions of the monopoly model exceed the CE46 . 
The average contract prices (figure-3) in all periods are above the high end of the 
competitive range (CEH) and below the monopoly level. Prices stay fairly close to the monopoly 
prediction only in phase-I of experiment-3. Prices slowly but consistently fall in the second 
phase of that experiment. Figure-4 displays the problem a monopoly faces. For example, in 
period one in experiment-4, the monopolist charges prices relatively close to the (single price) 
monopoly level and sells four units. The monopolist then sells one unit for substantially less, 
which reveals to the DC's that they can acquire units at a lower price. 
In period two, only two units are sold at high prices, afterwards pnces drop agam 
substantially. In period three the monopolist holds out for a long time until finally the DC buys 
at fairly high prices. Note, from then on average prices drop, since only one or two units are 
sold at high prices. In phase-I!, even this ceases to work after period three, and only by holding 
43 Prices are significantly greater than CEH in experiments 2 and 3 with inexperienced subjects and in 
experiments 3 and 4 with experienced subjects. 
44 The exceptions are DlP2IEIX, DlP2IE3X, DIPIXEIX, DlPIXE3X and DlPIXE4X. 
45 The exceptions are DIP2XE3X and DIP2XE4X (y> 0). 
46 The competitive equilibrium in phase-I (-Il) is 89-137 (67-82), the monopoly prediction is 599 (705). 
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out for a long time in period eight is the monopolist able to raise the price of at least one unit 
per period to higher levels. 
The patterns of contract prices provides some insights into buyer behavior. When the 
monopolist tries to price-discriminate some buyers 'learn' that the monopolist sells cheaper, and 
subsequently withhold their demand until the seller concedes. Not all buyers, however, take the 
'risk' to wait until the end of the period, since it is possible to be excluded from the market 
because of the time constraint. 
Convemence (Table-6) 
Generally prices converge from above to a level at, or above, the competitive equilibrium. 
For purposes of analysis of convergence, the equilibrium prediction used to calculate the 
differences was the high end of the competitive price range (CEH). This is done as prices tend 
to be above the competitive equilibrium47in all the experiments. Note, a significant a implies 
that prices are different from the initial equilibrium prediction (EQ). 
The asymptotic prediction is always above CEH and always below the monopoly level. 
Prices, in most cases are significantly different from both CEH and the monopoly prediction48 . 
The coefficient ~ is always positive and less than one 1 and usually significant49 indicating 
convergence of prices to levels between the competitive and the monopoly prediction, y is always 
4- As mentioned earlier, the choice of EQ in the equation (PI = PI - EQ) does not affect the asymptotic 
equilibrium prediction eASY), only the value of the coefficient ex. and its standard deviation. In the one case where 
ASY was below the competitive range a second regression was conducted with EQ equal to the low end of the 
competitiye range to test whether ex. was significantly different from zero. 
48 Among experienced subject ex. is not significantly different from zero in DIPIXEl Y and DIP2XE3Y (using 
the monopoly prediction) respectively DIP2XEl Y, DIP2XE3Y. 
49 The exceptions are DIP2IE4Y and DIPIXE3Y. 
Table-6 
Tests for Convergence-Design I, Market Y (Manufactw"ed Product) 
Model- p(t)=a + b * p(t-l) +c * [T(t)-T(t-l)]!T 
p(t) = P(t)-EQ; Asymptote = EQ + Alpha/(l-Beta) 
EQ in phase-I: 137 EQ in phase-ll:82 
Coeff. Stand. Devn. 
DIXI-Phase-I Alpha 9.68 43.36 
Beta 0.82 0.21 
Gamma 408.25 92.73 
Asympt. 192.02 
DI XEl-Phase-IT Alpha 17.54 8.58 
Beta 0.66 0.07 
Gamma 530.70 56.42 
Asympt. 132.91 
D 1 XE2-Phase-I Alpha 88.32 21.58 
Beta 0.37 0.11 
Gamma 463.68 77.52 
Asympt. 277.31 
D 1 XE2-Phase-I! Alpha 16.14 5.12 
Beta 0.58 0.04 
Gamma 767.30 39.62 
As)mpt. 119.99 
DIXE3-Phase-I Alpha 247.74 85.08 
Beta 0.34 0.21 
Gamma 99.29 102.02 
Asympt. 514.48 
DI XE3-Phase-II Alpha 21.91 30.76 
Beta 0.88 0.09 
Gamma 135.62 83.23 
Asympt. 269.01 
D 1 XE4-Phase-I Alpha 34.54 22.83 
Beta 0.55 0.09 
Gamma 1154 168.18 
Asympt. 213.66 
D 1 XE4-Phase-I! Alpha 33.33 12.20 
Beta 0.35 0.07 
Gamma 1180 135.11 
Asympt. 132.94 
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positive and usually significant50, indicating an upward shift of prices in market Y at the 
beginning of periods. This pattern is quite typical, as is seen in figure-4. The only exception 
is experiment-3, where prices are extremely stable until the last two periods of the second phase. 
The pattern of prices of this 'outIier' is displayed in figure-5. 
An explanation for the general decrease of prices and their shift at the beginning of a 
period is the specific structure of the supply and demand. Profitable trades can occur well above 
the competitive equilibrium, but not substantially below it. The marginal value of X decreases 
rapidly with the number of units a country holds (for any constant holding of y).5J Figure-6 
shows the supply and demand curves for X in phase-I, given that the market for manufactured 
products is already in equilibrium (i.e. every country holds two units of Y). Both supply and 
demand curves shift as units of X are traded. To show this effect the curves are drawn for the 
case when each country has traded none, one, two and three units of X, respectively. The 
upward shift of the supply curve is negligible compared to the huge downward shift of the 
demand curve as units of X are traded. 
This feature is important to explain the evolution of prices. Figure-7 shows the typical 
pattern of contract prices for experiment-3. Transactions are profitable for both trading partners 
at prices well above the competitive equilibrium (CE), but not at prices substantially below CE. 
The range of profitable prices becomes smaller as units of X are traded, also decreasing the 
asymmetry in the distribution of surplus. 
Terms of Trade 
Terms of trade are computed as ratio of the average prices in the last three periods. The 
50 The only exceptions occur in experiment 3 and with completely inexperienced subjects. 
SI X and Y are complements, i.e., the marginal value of X increases with the number of units of Y. 
Figure-5 : Design I, Experiment 3, Both Markets, Experienced Subjects 
Price Phase 1 
800 
640 
G- V' ~ .~ ...... .-\ -v ----~ /~ 480 
320 
(J~ ~~ -A ~...e - ~ J ..... ~~ ~ w ~ -U" -r- -..... ~ ~~ 
160 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Period 
800 Phase 2 
640 
CMIH: 
1-
.....- \,- -~- .A-4OI'> \ -.r ~ ~ ~ ~~-~ ~ -r--- e e 0 ea 
480 
320 
160 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Prices in market Y are always above prices in market x. 
10 Period 
Figure-6: Supply and Demand, Market X 
V-Market is in Equilibrium (every country holds 2 V) 
Price in Shillings (1500 SH = 1 $) 
600~----------------------------~ 
500 
400 
300 
200 
O~----------------------------~ 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 1517 19 2123 25 27 29 31 
Units 
-- Supply 0 
-t- Supply 1 
""* Supply 2 
---- Supply 3 
-+-- Demand 0 
-& Demand 1 
-*"" Demand 2 
-<>- Demand 3 
Supply and demand after each country has traded 0, 1, 2, and 3 units. 
Price 
1 2 
2 
Figure-7 : Pattern of Contract Prices 
Design 11 ~ Experiment 1. Market X 
Phase 1 
3 4 6 • 7 • Phase 2 
3 4 6 IS 7 , 
CE 
8 10 Period 
CE 
, 10 Period 
23 
ToT are generally below CEL52, but above the monopoly prediction (figure-8). ToT increase for 
three of the cases even though both models predict that ToT should worsen from phase-I to 
phase-II53 ToT are below eEL in phase-I in almost all periods. In three experiments ToT are 
fairIy close to the monopoly prediction at the end of phase-I. In phase-H, the ToT are stable and 
halfway between eEL and the monopoly prediction. 
Terms of Trade in the Monopoly Design (Table-7) 
ToT are computed as ratio of the average price in the last three periods. Both the 
monopoly and the competitive model predict that the ToT should worsen in design I. ToT 
increase in three experiments. This goes against the prediction of both the competitive and 
Table-7 
Terms of Trade:Design I 
Phase El E2 E3 E4 
1 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.47 
2 0.20 0.27 0.25 0.22 
the monopoly model. ToT in the last period decreases only in experiment-4. ToT in experiment-
4 increase during phase-I (ToT in the final three periods are higher than in all other periods) and 
drop drastically in the last three periods of the phase-H (before this ToT had never been below 
0.45). 
Trading Volume and Efficiencies 
The theoretical model predicts that the le should exert its market power by reducing the 
quantity in market Y, its output market. Quanitity is reduced (relative to the competitive 
S~ The low end of the competitive range. 
53 In fact ToT increase in three cases. 
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equilibrium) from 8 to 4 in phase-I and from 16 to 4 in phase-II. The quantity traded is close 
to the monopoly prediction in phase-I. 54 
In phase-II, quantity traded is close to the monopoly prediction in experiment-3 (where 
prices have been the highest). In other cases the quantity traded is around 8. The effect of 
restricting output and increasing price is best seen in experiment 4. Where, in phase-lIthe 
monopolist sold on an average 12 units during the first 8 periods at a price around 150 Shillings. 
In the last two periods it restricted sales to the monopoly level and increased the price to about 
350. 
Both the competitive and the monopsony model predict the same trading volume in the 
primary product market. The quantities purchased by the monopsonist vary substantially across 
different experiments. In experiment-3 the monopsonist purchases up to 10 units in phase-I and 
25 units in phase-I!. This also explains why prices exceed the competitive equilibrium in phase-
II. Quantities in all the other experiments are fairly close to the equilibrium prediction of 4 in 
phase-I and 8 in phase-I!. In phase-H, experiment-l is the exception. In this experiment the 
monopsonist paid prices very close to the monopsony level, but at the expense of quantity 
purchased. The average quantity purchased is four units. 
Due to the deadweight loss the monopoly model predicts efficiencies of 95% in phase-I 
and 88% in phase-II. Efficiencies are particularly low in experiment 3, in which the monopsonist 
purchased 'too many' units at a high price in market X and also charged the highest price as 
monopolist in market Y. Efficiencies in that experiment range from 77 to 87% during the last 
three periods of both phases. In the other experiments, efficiencies are around the level predicted 
S4 The average quantity traded is 4.2. During the last three periods, quantities are close to the competitive 
prediction of 8 only in one case (DIPlXE4Y). In this case the average contract price is also the lowest. 
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by the monopoly model at the end of phase-I, and often greater than in phase-I!.55 
Earnings 
Earnings are defined as the sum of the redemption values for the final holding of 
X and Y plus (or, minus) the trade surplus. 56 The values in the text are the average earnings in 
the last three periods of each phase. 
The competitive model predicts that the IC should earn (CEH =) 1960 in phase-I and 
(CEH=) 2580 in phase-II57 The earnings are lower than that predicted by the monopoly model 
(3560 and 4636). The earnings of DC predicted by the competitive model (phase one: CEL = 
960, phase 2: CEL = 1310)58 are higher than those predicted by the monopoly model (488 and 
559). The average earnings realized by DC are al ways59 higher than the monopoly prediction and 
lower than CEL. The earnings of the monopolists are between the monopoly prediction and 
above the CEH level60. 
Experiment-3 is the exception. Where, in the last four periods in phase-I! earnings of the 
55 For example in the last period of DIP2XE2, efficiency drops from 94 to 80%, after the average contract 
price in market Y increased from 141 to 198. However, efficienc: sometimes drops by ten percentage points or 
more from one period to another, sometimes due to increased prices in market Y 
56 Trade surplus is defined as revenues from sales minus expenditures on purchases. The reason for using 
earnings for comparisons and not trade surplus is that the latter is not very meaningful. A country can generate a 
high trade surplus by selling all its units and nevertheless not be in a very good position, because the redemption 
value is zero. This situation is comparable to a developing country exporting food while part of the population is 
star.ing. 
5~ Earnings cannot be compared to design III Cl 138 and 1596), since the equilibrium prediction is the same 
price range, but a higher output in market Y: The monopoly sells all units which are sold by four countries in the 
competitive design. 
58 In design III, due to the lower trading volume per country (only one instead of four units), the low range 
for earnings is 1182 and 1532 in phase-I and two, respectively. 
59 In all experiments and all periods 
60 Earnings are below CEH (but above CEL) ~n only 4 periods of 40 in phase-I, and in 3 periods of 30 
(without experiment-3) in phase-I!. 
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monopsonist are below CEL after the first period. This is the case because the IC purchased a 
greater number of units of X at a higher price than is predicted by the competitive model. 
Design-IT: The Competitive Design 
The competitive design has four IC's and four DC's. No communication is allowed. 
According to the competitive prediction prices are expected to converge to the competitive 
equilibrium in the markets for primary products (X) and for manufactured products (Y). In the 
phase-II of the experiment world income (and thus production) is doubled. Given the inelastic 
income elasticity of demand for primary products, the competitive prediction tells us that prices 
of primary products in phase-II should decrease more than the prices of manufactured products. 
As a result ToT for primary products are expected to worsen. 
Primarv Products Market (X) 
In the competitive design the four DC's are each endowed with eight units of the primary 
commodity in phase-I and with eight in phase-II. In the competitive equilibrium each developing 
country should sell four units of the primary product at a price in the range [74, 105] in phase-I, 
and eight units in phase-II at a price in the range [37, 43]. 
Prices in the competitive design (figure-9) are higher than the competitive level. Prices 
tend to shift upward at the beginning of periods and decrease over time. In market X prices for 
all groups at the end of the phase-II are lower than at the end of phase-I. This is in agreement 
with the prediction of the competitive model. Prices stay at, or above, the competitive 
equilibrium in all the experiments. 
Convergence (table-8) 
Fgure-9: Average Contract Prices 
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Table-8 
Tests for Convergence-Design IT, Market X (Primary Product) 
Model- p(t)=a + b • p(t-l) +c • [T(t)-T(t-l)]ff 
p(t) = P(t)-EQ; As)1TIptote = EQ + AJpha/(I-Beta); EQ in phase-I: 105 and EQ in phase-IT:43 
Coeff. Stand. Devn. 
D3XEI-Phase-I Alpha 0.00 4.04 
Beta 0.56 0.05 
Gamma 188.51 75.24 
As)mpt. 105 
D3XEI-Phase-IT Alpha 0.21 0.46 
Beta 0.89 0.02 
Gamma 126.66 9.86 
As)1TIpt. 44.84 
D3XE2-Phase-I Alpha 29.20 10.19 
Beta 0.75 0.05 
Gamma 706.73 83.29 
As)mpt. 222.83 
D3XE2-Phase-II Alpha 4.37 2.29 
Beta 0.90 0.02 
Gamma 308.59 28.91 
As)mpt. 85.07 
D3XE3-Phase-I Alpha 13.16 3.30 
Beta 0.54 0.07 
Gamma 85.80 40.62 
As)mpt. 133.67 
D3XE3-Phase-II Alpha 1.02 1.00 
Beta 0.80 0.03 
Gamma 175.39 20.46 
As)mpt. 48.08 
D3XE4-Phase-I Alpha 8.14 4.51 
Beta 0.81 0.04 
Gamma 349.08 39.27 
As)mpt. 148.06 
D3XE4-Phase-II Alpha 8.52 2.25 
Beta 0.78 0.04 
Gamma 121.12 20.16 
As)mpt. 81.88 
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It is seen that a is not significant61 in most cases. Indicating that prices tend toconverge 
to the higher end of the competitive equiIibrium62 . In all cases ~ is positive and less than one.63 
Indicating convergence to equilibrium from one side. In all cases, but one, ~ is significant. The 
asymptotic equilibrium prediction is always above CEH. 
In most cases the coefficient y is significant and positive, indicating a positive shift of 
prices at the beginning of periods, which decreases over time. Thus prices decrease both within 
and across periods. The coefficient y is usually positive and significant.64 
Manufactured Products (Y) 
Competitive equilibrium is between [89, 137] in phase-I and between [67, 82] in phase-II. 
The marginal value of Y decreases with the number of units a country holds. However, this 
decrease is not as pronounced as in the X-market. Supply and demand curves for Y also shift 
as units of X and Y are traded. Profitable trades can occur at prices well above the competitive 
equilibrium. The range for profitable trades becomes smaller as units of Y are traded, and the 
asymmetry in the distribution of surplus decreases. In market Y prices (figure-l 0) tend to start 
out above CEH and decrease over time. Prices shift upward at the beginning of each period 
displaying the same saw-tooth pattern as in market x.65 
Convergence (table-9) 
61 All results are reported at a significance level of 1%. 
62 The exceptions are experiments-2 (both phases) and -3 (phase-I). 
63 P ranges from 0.06 to 0.90. 
64 The only exception is D3PIXEIX. 
65 A possible explanation is the same as in market X, the margin of error is mainly above the competitive 
equilibrium and decreases as units are traded. A lot of learning is necessary until prices converge (from above) in 
this complex environment, but among experienced 3ubjects prices generally converge to the high end of the 
competitive range. 
Figure-10: Average Contract Prices 
Design 11, Market Y (Manufactured Product) 
Price in Shillings (1500 SH = 1 $) 
400~------------~------------~ 
300 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
200 - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 891011121314151617181920 
Phase 1 Period Phase 2 
-+- D3XE1 
-11- D3XE2 
-+- D3XE3 
-!f- D3XE4 
--. CEl 
CE --. CEH 
Table-9 
Tests for Convergence-Design IT, Market Y (Manufactured Product) 
Model- p(t)=a + b * pet-I) +c * [T(t)-T(t-I)]rr 
pet) = P(t)-EQ; Asymptote = EQ + Alpha/(1-Beta); EQ in phase-I:137-EQ in phase-IT:82 
Coeff. Stand. Devn. 
D3XE1-Phase-I Alpha -3.088 7.36 
Beta 0.04 0.12 
Gamma 261.42 82.11 
Asympt. 132.95 
D3 XE 1-Phase-II Alpha -2.57 2.16 
Beta 0.47 0.07 
Gamma 236.55 32.85 
Asympt. 77.13 
D3XE2-Phase-I Alpha 12.15 9.09 
Beta 0.50 0.08 
Gamma 720.38 99.56 
As)mpt. 161.36 
D3XE2-Phase-II Alpha 5.36 2.82 
Beta 0.68 0.06 
Gamma 220.69 33.15 
As)ropt. 100.38 
D3XE3-Phase-I Alpha 22.19 13.52 
Beta 0.52 0.09 
Gamma 757.11 114.86 
As)mpt. 184.52 
D3XE3-Phase-II Alpha 25.40 4.73 
Beta 0.45 0.06 
Gamma 295.32 45.55 
Asympt. 128.09 
D3XE4-Phase-I Alpha 10.86 6.19 
Beta 0.25 0.11 
Gamma 250.91 64.18 
Asympt. 15l.54 
D3XE4-Phase-II Alpha 23.35 10.30 
Beta 0.07 0.08 
Gamma 133.48 158.72 
Asympt. 107.22 
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The coefficient a. is usually positive and in most cases it is not significant. Prices tend 
to converge to the high end of the equilibrium range, or above it. 66 
The asymptotic equilibrium prediction is usually above CEH. In all cases the coefficient 
~ is positive and less than one. Indicating convergence to an equilibrium from one side. In all 
but five cases ~ is significant67 and y is usually positive and significant, indicating that prices 
shift upward at the beginning of periods. 
Terms of Trade (table-l 0) 
The equilibrium range for the ToT is (0.54 to 1.18) in phase-I and narrows to (0.45 to 
0.64) in phase-II. ToT worsen for all groups. In phase-I, ToT are usually within the competitive 
(figure-ll) range and in phase-I! on average ToT are at the high end of the range. 68 ToT do not 
seem to follow a clear trend but generally stabilize within the last few periods. 
In phase-I ToT in three experiments clearly converge to the competitive range (all 
observations on ToT in the last four periods of phase-I are that range). Experiment-2 is an 
exception, where ToT in most periods is above the competitive equilibrium (CE). In experiment-
2, where prices in market X had been higher than in other experiments, ToT varies substantially 
across periods. 
In phase-H, ToT are always above the CE in experiments -2 and -4. In phase-H, after the 
fourth period, ToT stay at the CE in experiment-l and are below the CE in experiment-3. The 
hypothesis that the terms of trade are equal to the competitive equilibrium cannot be rejected. 
66 The only exception is the second phase of experiment 3, where prices do not converge to the competitive 
equilibrium. 
6- ~ ranged from 0.04 to 0.68. It is not significant in experiments D3PIXEIY D3PIXE4Y and D3P2XE4Y. 
68 Only in one experiment they are in within the (narrow) equilibrium range. 
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TABLE-10 
Terms of Trade-Design III 
EXPERIENCED 
Ph. El E2 E3 E4 
1 0.65 l.38 0.58 0.99 
2 0.49 0.97 0.33 0.83 
In phase-I the mean (0.898) is within the competitive range (0.54-l.18). In phase-II the mean 
(0.656) is not significantly different from the high end of the competitive range (0.64)69. To 
test the hypothesis the terms of trade worsen as ·income increases, a paired !-test is conducted. 
Terms of trade decrease significantly in all cases. 
Trading Volume and Efficiency 
The net trading volume is generally below the competitive equilibrium. This is true 
especially in experiments where prices are above the competitive equilibrium. Almost all 
possible gains from trade are realized at the end of the experiment. 
Quantities generally stay below the competitive equilibrium. Quantity is lower in 
experiments where average prices are higher than the competitive equilibrium.70 The total trading 
volume, including the trades in one side of the market, is substantially higher. Especially in 
market X where the difference is relatively high. On the average trading volume is six units per 
period. Efficiency is around 94% and 95% in phase-I and -11, repectively. 
Earnings 
69 The alternative hypothesis was that they are higher. Since there are only four observations for terms of 
trade in each phase, significance levels of 10%, or better, are reported. The means are 0.754 and 0.668 in phase-I 
and two, respectively. For phase-I! the t-values are below 0.2. 
70 For example in both phases of experiment-2, market X. 
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On the average earnings are within the equilibrium prediction. For IC's earnings for most 
cases
71 
are within the competitive range (918-113 8) in phase-I. In phase-II earnings are below 
the equilibrium (1488-1596) in experiments -2 and -4, and above the equilibrium in experiment-3. 
Average earnings of industrialized countries increase across all experiments in phase-II. In phase-
I earnings of DC's are below the equilibrium (1182-1402) in experiment-l and above the 
equilibrium in experiment-2. In phase-II earnings are below the equilibrium (1532-1640) in 
experiments -1 and -3 and above in experiment-2. None of the outcomes are significantly below 
the lower end of the competitive range. 
Design-In: The Cartel Design 
The DC's are allowed to communicate. Communication is allowed both, before and 
during each period. Before each period the subjects in the role of a DC have two minutes for 
oral communication in a separate room. During each period subjects are allowed to send 
messages via computer7 : All cartel groups immediately realize the opportunity to influence 
prices as sellers in the market for primary products. As buyers they realize much later (if at all) 
that they can influence prices. 
Most groups agree only upon high prices but, rarely discuss output restrictions. In one 
experiment subjects decided to separate the market for primary products into bilateral bargaining 
in the sense that each one of them was assigned a particular counterpart.73 Several groups agreed 
-I The exception is experiment-2 where earnings are lower. 
- Subjects were not allowed to agree on side-payments, to reveal their identity number as trader, or to make 
physical threats. 
73 The agreement was that, for instance, subject seven would exclusively sell to subject four, subject six would 
exclusively sell to subject three etc. This agreement was soon abandoned, once some subjects started to cheat on 
it. Cheating occurred in many cases. 
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not to offer below a certain price, but anyone could accept bids from the other side. In many 
groups subjects agreed to lower prices at the end of a period. 
Some groups did not agree on maximum prices they were willing to pay in the market 
for manufactured products, and if they did, it was in the form of recommendations instead of firm 
agreements. These, non-binding lax agreements could have been the reason why subjects did not 
succeed in exploiting their market power as buyers in the same manner as they did as sellers. 74 
In experiment-3 the inability of the cartel to influence prices in the market for manufactured 
products is particularly evident. There is some evidence of tacit collusion among sellers in 
Market-Y. However, it eventually broke down. At the end of the second phase the prices in 
market Y are indistinguishable from other groups (note, upto this point the group of IC's had kept 
prices above those of all other groupsf5. 
The Market for PrimarY Products 
The cartel model predicts that prices should increase relative to the high end of the 
equilibrium range76 and rise from phase-I to phase-I!. All cartel groups are able to increase prices 
(figure-12) above the competitive level, but not to the predicted cartel level. Prices decrease over 
time remaining above CEH and shift upward at the beginning of periods. Prices at the end of 
the second phase in all experiments are lower than at the end of the first phase. This is contrary 
to the predictions of the cartel model. 
74 Tt is possible to conduct intragroup comparisons, since the same group of people who form the sellers' cartel 
in market X can fonn a buyers' cartel in market Y. 
7l Subjects in this experiment were asked to fill out a questionnaire after the experiment was over. Two of 
the four subjects realized that it was beneficial for them" ... not to undersell each other". One subject stated" ... 
there was a basic understanding between the four of us that we shouldn't go above or below certain prices". This 
collusion was successful for a long time, it broke down in the second phase. Apparently only two subjects 
consciously influenced the market and the other two followed al,?ng. 
76 The price predictions for the cartel are 358 in phase-! (CEH: 105) and 431 (CEH: 43) in phase-I!. 
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In most experiments prices of primary products are fairly stable. The only exception is 
experiment-2, in which prices in phase-I are above the cartel level. In that experiment the sellers' 
cartel in market X seems to work best, but prices sometimes drop drastically. By how much a 
well functioning cartel can influence prices is best seen between period 8 and 9 phase-I!. The 
cartel group abandoned their agreements and the average contract price plummeted by 60%. In 
the next period this group manages to increase the price of X again but, never upto previous 
levels. 
Convergence (table-I I ) 
Prices converge in all cases to levels below the cartel prediction 77 but, always remam 
above the high end of the competitive range78 ~ is usually significant (positive and less than 
one) indicating convergence from one side. y is positive, indicating a shift at the beginning of 
periods which decreases over time and is often significant79 . 
Market for Manufactured Products 
In the market for manufactured products the cartel is on the buyers' side. Functioning as 
a monopsony it can lower prices (relative to eEL), in the Y market80. Average contract prices 
do not decrease below CEL8l (figure-l3) and in a large number of cases are above CEH. Prices 
usually converge from above to the competitive equilibrium at the end of a phase. The buyer 
,. Only in experiment 2, phase-I, the difference is not significant. The (X.- values of the regression \vith EQ 
equal to the cartel prediction are -4.20 (Std. Dev. 8.53) and -13.96 (Std. Dev. 12.42) for inexperienced and 
experienced subjects, respectively. 
-8 The table below contains results from the regression using EQ = CEH. In all cases the asymptotic 
prediction is above CEH. In several phases of experiment 2 the significance level is only 1.2%. 
79 The only exceptions occur with completely inexperienced subjects and in experiment 1. 
80 The price predictions for the cartel are 67 (CEL = 89) in phase-I and 35 in phase-II (CEL = 67). 
81 The only exceptions is and in the last period of D4P2XE2Y the average contract price is 66 (CEL = 67). 
Figure-13: Average Contract Prices 
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Table-II 
Tests for Convergence-Design ill Market Y (Primary Product) 
Model- P(t)=a + b * p(t-l) +c * [T(t)-T(t-l)]ff 
p(t) = P(t)-EQ; Asymptote = EQ + Alphal(1-Beta) 
EQ in phase-l:l05-EQ in phase-II:43 
Coeff. Stand. Devn. 
D4XE 1-Phase-I Alpha 78.21 13.94 
Beta 0.39 0.09 
Gamma 93.02 92.56 
Asympt. 234.01 
D4XE 1-Phase-II Alpha 53.38 7.42 
Beta 0.41 0.06 
Gamma 244.46 99.51 
Asympt. 133.11 
D4 XE2-Phase-I Alpha 67.45 28.20 
Beta 0.68 0.09 
Gamma 503.10 127.12 
Asympt. 314.63 
D4XE2-Phase-II Alpha 31.48 13.55 
Beta 0.68 0.06 
Gamma 837.41 101.51 
As)mpt. 141.85 
D4XE3-Phase-I Alpha 7.28 8.13 
Beta 0.65 0.06 
Gamma 744.91 102.62 
Asympt. 125.72 
D4XE3-Phase-II Alpha 9.35 3.34 
Beta 0.82 0.06 
Gamma 85.03 20.16 
Asympt. 95.78 
D4 XE4-Phase-I Alpha 99.79 20.77 
Beta 0.48 0.09 
Gamma 470.81 75.85 
Asympt. 296.11 
D4XE4-Phase-II Alpha 118.87 23.33 
Beta 0.50 0.09 
Gamma 317.94 82.47 
Asympt. 279.00 
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cartel fails to exert its market power. As is predicted by both the cartel and the competitive 
model prices at the end of phase-I are higher than at the end of phase-I!. 
Conven2:ence (table-12) 
The asymptotic prediction is in the competitive range in three cases. 82 In all the other 
cases the asymptotic prediction is above the high end of the competitive range. a is significant 
in experiment 3, phase-I and experiment 1, phase-II83. Prices converge only in experiments 2 and 
4 to the competitive equilibrium and ~ is positive84 and less than one in most of the cases 
(indicating convergence from above). y is positive, indicating that prices shift upward at the 
beginning of periods85 . 
Terms of Trade (figure-14) 
Contrary to the prediction of the cartel model the cartel is unable to obtain favorable terms 
of trade. However, it usually improves its ToT beyond the competitive level. Whether a cartel 
can improve its ToT when income increases is inconclusive. Terms of trade for all cases are 
below the cartel prediction. In experiment-3 the ToT is below the low end of the competitive 
range in several periods. ToT increase within the second phase. 
This result suggests with communication tacit collusion. In experiment-I, the ToT rise 
steadily in phase-I and decrease in phase-I!. Experiments -2 and -4 exhibit cartel behavior. In 
D4P2XE2Y and D4PIXE4Y 
83 The significance levels in the other phases of these experiments are 2.2% in D4PIXEIY and 1.6% in 
D4P2XE3Y. 
84 The only exception is D4PIXE3Y, the experiment in which the industrialized countries charged 
substantially h:f!ner prices than in all other experiments. The negative coefficient indicates that prices overshoot 
the equilibrium, which seems to explain the behavior of prices in that experiment fairly well. 
85 Y is significant only in phase-I (D4PIXE4Y). It is not usually significant in the second phase (except 
D4P2XEIY). 
Table-12 
Tests for Convergence-Design ID, Market Y (Manufactured Product) 
Model- p(t)=a + b * p(t-l) +c * [T(t)-T(t-l)]tT 
p(t) = P(t)-EQ; Asymptote = EQ + Alphal(l-Beta) 
EQ in phase-I: 137 EQ in phase-II:82 
Coeff. Stand. DeVIl. 
D3XEI-Phase-I Alpha 24.59 11.93 
Beta 0.66 0.09 
Gamma 59.08 109.82 
Asympt. 210.37 
D3XEl-Phase-IT Alpha l3.59 2.68 
Beta 0.56 0.06 
Gamma 1.25 31.49 
Asympt. 112.73 
D3XE2-Phase-I Alpha 7.38 6.67 
Beta 0.81 0.06 
Gamma 166.82 54.19 
Asympt. 176.04 
D3 XE2-Phase-II Alpha -1.65 1.63 
Beta 0.80 0.04 
Gamma 219.60 30.28 
Asjmpt. 73.72 
D3XE3-Phase-I Alpha 245.42 41.20 
Beta -0.11 0.17 
Gamma 134.76 176.89 
Asympt. 357.58 
D3XE3-Phase-II Alpha 12.19 5.73 
Beta 0.54 0.07 
Gamma 331.17 65.50 
Asympt. 108.70 
D3XE4-Phase-I Alpha -2.39 4.75 
Beta 0.35 0.08 
Gamma 20.66 53.64 
Asympt. 133.33 
D3XE4-Phase-IT Alpha 1.53 2.45 
Beta 0.50 0.08 
Gamma 154.66 34.79 
Asympt. 54.04 
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both the experiments ToT in phase-I start out in the competitive range and increase subsequently 
when the cartel becomes operative. A common pattern is that ToT decrease after reaching high 
levels. This could be due to the fact that when ToT are favorable the incentive to cheat is also 
greatest. 86 
At the end of each phase ToT is below the cartel level. ToT is not significantly above 
the high end of the competitive range in phase-I, but it is in phase-H. 87 This result is due to the 
'outlier', experiment 3. In all other experiments the ToT are above the high end of the 
competitive range by a wide margin. 
We can conclude that the terms of trade are higher than the CE. Even though cartels fail 
to keep prices down in the market for manufactured products overall they improve the terms of 
trade. 
Terms of Trade (table-l3) 
A perfectly functioning cartel should be able to avert the worsening of the ToT and 
Table-l3 
Terms of Trade-Design IV 
Experience~ 
Ph. El E2 E3 E4 
1 l.37 l.91 0.39 2.45 
2 l.00 2.28 l.00 3.58 
86 Howe\'er, the drastic drop in tenns of trade between periods eight and nine of the second phase of experiment 
2 has a different explanation. When the cartel group in that experiment decided to abandon their agreements, the 
result was a major drop in prices for the primary product (prices in the Y market stayed the same, since the buyers' 
cartel had not worked anyway). 
8' Because of the low power of the test with only four observations ex. = 10% was chosen as level of 
significance. Results are significant in all the cases (the alternative hypothesis was that ToT are above CEH). 
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improve it as income increases. 
ToT in phase-I and -H, do not differ significantly. In three of the experiments ToT 
increase. This result is important as it indicates that a cartel can avert worsening terms of trade. 
Trading Volume and Efficiency 
The trading volume in market-X in phase-I is lower than in the competitive equilibrium 
(=16) but, is close to the cartel prediction (=8)88. In phase-H, the average trading volume (=14) 
is substantially less than the competitive prediction (=32) and greater than the prediction of the 
cartel model (=8). In experiments -2 and -4 the average trading volume is 8.8, close to the cartel 
prediction. Other than in the competitive design, there is almost no trade among members of one 
side of the market89 In market Y both the competitive and the cartel model predict a trading 
volume of 8 in phase-I. The quantities traded are less (on average 6). However, by the end of 
phase-I, the trading volume in experiment-3 90 is below 8. In phase-I!, the competitive model 
predicts a trading volume of 16 and the cartel model predicts 12. In most experiments the 
quantity traded is closer to the cartel, than the competitive, prediction91 . 
Efficiencies are lower than in the competitive design. Efficiencies sometimes tend to 
decrease substantially at the end of a phase. Efficiency is much more volatile relative to the 
competitive design. It sometimes drops by twenty percentage points from one period to the next. 
We thus see that the activity of the cartel results in a substantial dead weight 10ss.92 
88 Tt averaged less than 9 units (between: 5.5-11.5) units. 
89 Since the cartel voluntarily restricts trade, the quantities traded do not overshoot the equilibrium and 
reversing equilibrating trades are not necessary. 
90 In experiment-3 the industrialized countries were able to collude tacitly. 
91 Average quantity traded is between 10 and 13. The exception is experiment-2 (18). 
91 Efficiencies in the last period range from 54% to 90% and from 82 to 97% in phase-I and -II , respectively. 
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Earnings 
The earnings ofIC's are below the low end of the competitive equilibrium range (918 in 
phase-I and 1488 in phase-H) but, greater than the prediction of the cartel model. During the last 
three periods, the average earnings of IC' s in all experiments are below CEL. 
In phase-I, earnings of DC's are below the competitive range (1182-1402) in experiment 
3, within the range in experiment 1, and above the range in experiments 2 and 4. This reflects 
the importance of relative bargaining strength of different groups and that cartels are not always 
able to increase their earnings. In phase-H, the last three periods earnings of DC's are above the 
high end of the competitive range. Even though subjects never earn cartel payoffs (1873 and 
2394 in phase-I and -H, respectively), in experiments -2 and -4 they come close to it. 
We can thus conclude that market power can be successfully used by the cartel members. 
This is true especially in phase-H, when the competitive model predicts that the income of LDC's 
increases by an amount less than that of the industrialized countries (because of the worsening 
terms of trade) the cartel can improve the DC's earnings. 
Conclusion: 
The industrialized countries are unable to keep prices below the competitive equilibrium 
as monopsonists in market X. At the same time as monopolists in market Y they are able to 
charge prices which are higher than the competitive equilibrium. The buyers cannot exploit their 
market power in this environment the sellers are able to exploit their market power. The terms 
of trade are usually between the competitive range and the monopoly level. Terms of trade 
increase from phase-I to phase-H, contradicting both the competitive and the monopoly model. 
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The single IC is unable to exploit its market power to the full extent93 
Prices in the "competitive" design do not always converge to the equilibrium. Prices in 
both markets decrease, within and across periods, and are generally above the competitive 
equilibrium. This result can be attributed to the specific structure of supply and demand, that 
leaves a lot of room for profitable trades above, but not below the competitive equilibrium. 
Prices converge to either the high end of the competitive range, or stay above it. In phase-II 
prices remain significantly above the equilibrium only in one experiment. In the market for 
manufactured products prices remain above the equilibrium in only one experiment in phase-I!. 
The effect of higher prices is a drop in efficiency, albeit small. The earnings of both developing 
and industrialized countries are on average at the low end of the equilibrium range. In all 
experiments ToT worsen for the DC's. 
The members of the commodity cartel are able to substantially increase the prices of the 
primary commodity. They do so mainl)' with price agreements and not by making agreements 
on quotas. Cheating on price agreements is observed. The sellers' cartel is successfully able to 
increase prices in the primary product market. 
In the market for manufactured products the cartel has the opportunity to exert market 
power as a buyers' cartel but, it fails to lower the prices below the competitive equilibrium. In 
most cases, prices are above the high end of the competitive range. This indicates that the 
buyers' cartel is unable to control prices. In one case the group of four industrialized countries 
is able to increase prices by tacitly colluding. Most cartel groups immediately realize the 
possibility to influence prices as sellers. Though, this is not always true in their role as buyers. 
93 V.L. Smith, "An Empirical Study of Decentralized Institutions of Monopoly Restraint," in G. Horwich and 
1. Quirk (eds), Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics, (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1981). 
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Even though the cartel only works reasonably well in the primary product market, the ToT 
increase above the competitive level. Contrary to the predictions of the cartel model, prices never 
increase from phase-I to phase-II in the market for primary products but, the final terms of trade 
increases in half of the experiments. The cartel has the potential to avert the decrease in the ToT 
but, is not always successful. The cartel mainly affects the trading volume in the market for 
primary products and not in the manufactured products market. This result conforms with the 
theoretical prediction. Efficiencies are lower compared to the competitive design and the cartel 
causes a dead weight loss. The cartel members usually succeed in improving their earnings 
beyond the competitive equilibrium, but not to the levels predicted by the cartel model. On the 
average, the earnings of the industrialized countries suffer decrease well below the competitive 
Thus, terms of trade deteriorate in the Competitive design confirming the prediction of 
the prediction of the theoretical model. The commodity cartel is able to increase primary export 
prices but, is unable to stop the decline in prices when income increases. Terms of trade for the 
cartel are usually better and do not always worsen. For the case of the single industrialized 
country facing four developing countries ToT usually improve as income grows. This contradicts 
both the competitive and the cartel model. 
We thus see that the 'pure' prediction of the Prebisch-Singer (PS) theory of unequal 
exchange does not hold. That is, the monopoly (DC) is unable to lower prices of the primary 
product. However, its ToT improve as it is able to increase the price of the manufactured good. 
The PS hypothesis thus tends to overstate the effect on ToT. Relaxing the assumptions on 
94 With the exception of the first phase of expl!riment 3, in which the industrialized countries are able to 
collude tacitly. 
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market structures and allowing for competitive outcomes and a commodity cartel we see that ToT 
worsen for DC's in both the designs. This goes against the theoretical prediction in both the 
models. Once more we can conclude that the effects on ToT are overstated by the theoretical 
predictions as is reflected by our experiments. 
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Appendix: Trniner session. 
Subjects received L-shaped squares which allowed them to identify profitable 
trades in each market, given their current holding of X and Y. These squares provided 
the following information: "It is profitable to buy below ... ", pointing to the marginal 
value of an additional unit in that market. "It is profitable to sell above ... ", pointing 
to the marginal value of the last unit owned. Copies of the squares are printed in the 
appendix. After the computerized training program subjects participated in three to 
six training periods with exactly the same features as the actual two experiments in 
which they participated during the subsequent two sessions. They did not receive any 
payoff for the first round of the trainer. Subjects also had the possibility to practice 
the communication option the MUDA software offers for subjects in design Ill, in 
which communication is allowed. During the trainer in design 11 the subjects were not 
allowed to talk before each period. This was done because oral communication was 
thought of as not needing practice. During the training periods subjects had extensive 
opportunity to ask questions as well as to check their accounting. During the first 
two periods of the trainer the accounting of all subjects was checked, later only 
questions answered. The accounting was verified before subjects came back for the 
subsequent session. 
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